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The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA") grants Indian tribes the right to enter into tribal-state
compacts that regulate gambling on Indian lands. 25 U.S.C.A §§2701-2721. Under the IGRA, if an Indian
tribe requests that a state negotiate over gaming activities that are permitted within that state, the state is
required to negotiate in good faith toward the formation of a compact that governs the proposed gaming
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activities. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g, 99 F. 3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996). Nationwide, there are 225 Indian tribes engaged
in gaming operations. National Indian Gaming Agency, NIGA Resource Library, The Economic Impacts of
Indian Gaming in 2006, http://www.indiangaming.org/library/index.shtml (accessed Oct. 21 2007). 
 
 
In California, the governor has been authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts with Indian tribes,
subject to ratification by the California legislature. These agreements can encompass the operation of slot
machines, the conduct of lottery games, and banking and percentage card games. Cal. Const. Art. IV §
19(f). California is a party to 64 tribal-state compacts and has more gaming tribes than any other state, with
43 currently hosting some form of gambling. Institute of Government Studies Library, Indian Gaming in
California, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/htIndianGaming.htm (accessed Oct. 21, 2007). 
 
 
Recently, the California legislature ratified four compacts with four California tribes (Pechanga, Morongo,
Agua Caliente, and Sycuan) to install additional slot machines in their Casinos. California Senate Bills 174,
175, 903, and 957 (July 10, 2007). Propositions 94, 95, 96, and 97 are four referenda that will appear on the
ballot for the California Presidential Primary Election on February 5, 2008. These referenda will give
California voters a chance to overturn the compacts approved by the legislature and signed by the Governor.







Currently there are four referenda on the February 2008 ballot. These referenda are targeting amendments to
existing agreements with four of the major gaming tribes in California, the Big 4 (Morongo Band of
Mission Indians, Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, Pechanga Band of the Luiseño Mission Indians,
and the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians). The compacts were negotiated by the Governor and
ratified by the Legislature as called for by California Constitution. Cal. Const. art. IV § 19.
The compacts with the respective tribes are similar in nature. The focus of the compacts revolves around an
extreme increase in Class III Gaming Devices (slot machines) permitted in tribal casinos. The chart below
illustrates the increase in slot machines approved by the current compacts:
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Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians
2,000 3,000 5,000
San Manuel Band of
Mission Indians
2,000 5,500 7,500
*Statistics taken from Tribal Compacts
Another important element of the compacts is the revenue they will generate for the State's General Fund.
Within the expansive compacts there is a formula for calculating the revenue that the tribes will share with
the State; First Amendment to the Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the Agua
Caliente Band of Cahuila Indians, pt. II, art. d (July 10, 2007).
 
(d) (i) For purposes of subdivision (b)(ii), the Net Win generated from the operation of all
additional Gaming Devices over the existing 2,000 Gaming Devices shall be calculated by
multiplying the average Net Win per Gaming Device for the quarter by the average number of
Gaming Devices operated during that quarter in excess of 2,000.
(ii) The average Net Win is the total Net Win for the quarter divided by the average number of Gaming
Devices present on the floors of the Tribe's Gaming Facilities during that quarter.
(iii) In turn, the average number of Gaming Devices for the quarter shall be determined by aggregating each
day's total number of Gaming Devices present on the floors of the Tribe's Gaming Facilities for each day
that the Gaming Facilities are open to the public during that quarter and dividing that total by the number of
days in the quarter that the Gaming Facilities are open.
The formula setout above sets a revenue sharing method, where the state will receive a percentage of the net
win of each machine calculated at the end of each month. This formula will only apply to new slot
machines included in the current compacts. This formula differs from the original compact revenue sharing
formula, which applied a flat fee paid directly to the State's General Fund for each slot machine.
The compacts differ between the tribes in dealing with the gaming facilities. The agreement with the
Morongo Tribe authorizes the operation of the existing two casinos along with an auxiliary facility. CA
Senate, Analysis on Bill 174 (June 28 2007). The Sycuan Tribe is authorized to operate two casinos on the
existing reservation including any adjustment to its boundaries to include contiguous property as specified
by the agreement. CA Senate, Analysis of Senate Bill 175 (June 28, 2007). The Pechanga Tribe is
authorized to operate not more than two gaming facilities on its existing land. CA Senate, Analysis of
Senate Bill 903 (June 28, 2007). The Agua Caliente Tribe is permitted to operate the existing two casinos as
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well as an additional casino so long as the Tribe can show local support. CA Senate, Analysis on Senate Bill
957 (June 28, 2007).
The amended compacts also have shared provisions:
1) A requirement that the expanding tribes make payments to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund that helps
support non-gambling and gambling tribes that operate less than 350 slot machines;
2) A provision that ceases payments to the Special Distribution Fund which supports state regulatory costs,
problem gambling and backfills the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund in case of shortfall;
3) An Exclusivity Agreement, which allows the tribes the option to either terminate their compact or modify
the payments to the State as provided. This would occur if the Tribe's core geographic market was infringed
by other Class III gaming activities;
4) A second Exclusivity Clause which provides the same options as the aforementioned clause in the event
that any entity other than an Indian Tribe is authorized to engage in Class III banking and percentage card
games;
5) A requirement of Slot Machine testing by state inspectors up to 4 times a year to ensure that the
machines are working according to the manufacturer's technical standards;
6) Building Code Requirements;
7) Provisions dealing with patron disputes;
8) An agreement that Public and Workplace Health, Safety and Liability standards will be the same as or
more stringent than state standards. However, under the agreements the tribes are not required to submit to
the jurisdiction of county or state inspectors;
9) A tort liability ordinance that will allow for California tort law to govern all claims. The tribe must waive
sovereign immunity and consent to binding arbitration enforceable in State or Federal Court. Tort liability
also sets forth a minimum policy in the event of an occurrence;
 10) A requirement that each tribe obtain Workers Compensation coverage through self-insurance or
participation in the state workers compensation system;
11) Provisions requiring mitigation of off-reservation impacts mandating that the tribes to prepare
environmental impact reports to assess possible effects of expansion. This clause also requires the Tribe to
enter into agreements with the respective counties and any cities within a quarter mile from any portion of
the casino or other structures;
12) Labor provisions which set forth standards no less stringent then standards contained in the Fair Labor
Standards Act. California S. 174 (July 10, 2007); California S. 175 (July 10, 2007); California S. 903 (July
10, 2007); California S. 957 (July 10, 2007).
The new amendments to the compacts seek to benefit the Indian tribes with the expansion on gaming and to
benefit California's General Fund with increased sharing in accordance with the compacts.
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B. Effects of the Referenda
In the February 2008 election California voters will have the opportunity to decide whether to repeal the
compacts entered into by the Governor and ratified by the legislature. A YES vote will affirm the compacts
already approved by the legislature and Governor. A NO vote will send the Governor back into negotiations
with the tribes. Because a YES vote approves and a NO vote disapproves, referenda are confusing to some
people who think that if they like a measure they should vote YES. Here, those who agree with the
proponents of the measure should vote NO. 
 
III. Drafting Issues
The specific language for the proposed Referenda will not be of issue. The referenda seek to repeal the
Amendments to already existing agreements between the Indian Tribes and the State of California.
 
Iv. Constitutional and Statutory Issues
A. Referenda
The California Constitution grants California citizens the power to directly affect the lawmaking process of
California by voting on ballot propositions. Cal. Const. art. II, §§ 8, 9 (West 2007). There are two forms of
ballot propositions: Initiatives and referenda. The initiative process is the power of the electors to propose
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them. Cal. Const. art. II, § 8. The
referendum, on the other hand, is he power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes
Cal. Const. art. II, § 9. Therefore, while initiatives ask voters to enact a new law, referenda allow voters to
approve or disapprove laws that have already been enacted by the California Legislature. The referendum
facilitates popular review of a law enacted through the Legislature. Proposition 94, 95, 96, 97 are referenda
on Senate Bills 174, 175, 903, and 957, respectively.
B. State Constitutional Issues
There are several state constitutional issues that have been litigated in this case and will likely continue to
be litigated after the election if Propositions 94 through 97 should receive a majority of NO votes, repealing
the compacts. In October 2007, three of the "Big 4" tribes whose compacts are at issue in the referenda filed
lawsuits attempting to stop the California Secretary of State, Debra Bowen, from placing Propositions 94
through 97 on the ballot. See, Macarro v. Bowen, Case No. 07CS01359 (Sac. Super Ct., October 10, 2007)
(Pechanga case); Martin v. Bowen, Case No. 07CS01355 (Sac. Super. Ct., October 10, 2007)(Morongo
case); and
Milanovich v. Bowen, Case No. 07CS01369 (Sac. Super.Ct., October 12, 2007)(Agua Caliente case).
The Pechanga and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians lawsuits alleged that the proponents of the initiative
did not present the required signatures to the Secretary of State in due time and therefore, the referenda are
invalid. Martin v. Bowen, supra, 07CS01355; Macarro v. Bowen, supra, 07CS01359. The Agua Caliente
lawsuit challenged the referenda as improper uses of the Constitutional power guaranteed to the people in
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the state constitution. Milanovich v. Bowen, supra, 07CS01369. The lawsuits were brought as petitions for
writ of mandate directing the Secretary of State to refuse to place the Propositions on the ballot. All three
writs of mandate were denied by Superior Court of Sacramento. Martin, Macarro, Milanovich, supra.
The tribes sought review in the California Court of Appeal for the Third District on an expedited basis
because of the nature of the pre-election posture of the appeals. The Agua Caliente tribe brought two
appellate cases; one a petition for writ of mandate directed toward the Sacramento County Superior Court,
the other an appeal of the denial of the writ of mandate directed to Secretary of State Bowen. Milanovich v.
Superior Court, Case No. C057517 (CA 3rd Dist., Dec. 3, 2007) and Milanovich v. Bowen, Case No.
C057747 (CA 3rd Dist., Dec. 19, 2007). Petitions for review in the Macarro and Martin cases, concerning
the question of whether proponents substantially complied with the timeline for qualifying a referendum
pursuant to the California Constitution, were filed in November and subsequently denied. Martin v. Bowen,
Case No. C057461 (CA 3rd Dist., Dec.7, 2007) and Macarro v. Bowen, Case No. C057451 (CA 3rd Dist.,
Dec. 7, 2007). On the same day that the Pechanga and Morongo appellate writs were denied, Agua
Caliente's petition for writ of mandate filed in the Third District Court of Appeal and directed to the
Sacramento Superior Court was also denied. Milanovich, Case No. C057517 (CA 3rd Dist., Dec. 7, 2007).
However, the appeal of the Superior Court opinion in the Agua Caliente case against Secretary of State
Bowen is still an open case. Milanovich, supra, Case No. C057747. The resolution of this matter will await
the outcome of the election. Essentially, this case focuses on whether the ratifications of compacts are
statutes that can be subject to the referendum process. The Agua Caliente tribe also argues that the compacts
relate to taxes, levies or appropriations and are not subject to the initiative and referendum process for this
reason. Finally, the tribe makes a technical argument suggesting that the proponents did not comply with
the "full text" requirement when they circulated the referendum. The first two of these questions go to the
power of the electorate to vote on the referenda. The third relates to whether the proper steps were taken in
the presentation of the petition. The court's failure to grant relief on these fundamental questions in a pre-
election challenge may signal that it does not view the legal claims to be of considerable merit. Nonetheless,
the litigation over this issue will likely continue on after the election on February 5, if the NO campaign is
successful.
The Pechanga and Morongo, concerning the 90 day signature requirement, were summarily denied in the
Court of Appeal. These cases turn on an interpretation of a particular provision of the California
Constitution. In the Morongo case, Martin v. Bowen the tribe filed a petition for review with the California
Supreme Court. Martin v. Bowen, Case No. S159084 (Cal. Dec. 14, 2007). The Martin v. Bowen petition
for review was denied by the Supreme Court on January 3, 2008. Id.. The same issue may be considered,
though, by the Macarro suit, if the California Supreme Court decides to hear the case after the election.
Generally, courts prefer to hear matters post-election, especially where statutory or constitutional
interpretation is at issue and the power of the electorate is not. Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 986
(2006). Since interpretation of the 90 day qualification requirement (a provision that has been included in
the California Constitution for almost 100 years) will be a case of first impression in the California Supreme
Court, it is likely that the Court would want to wait until after the election to rule on the claim in order to
provide adequate time for briefing of the issue and deliberation by the Justices.
 
Substantively, the 90 day claim will turn on whether precise or substantial compliance will be required for
initiative and referendum petitions. If substantial compliance is the standard, the inquiry into whether that
standard was met will be a somewhat factual one. The California Constitution provides in pertinent part,
"referendum measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State, within 90 days after the
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enactment date of the statute, a petition certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5
percent of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election, asking that the statute
or part of it be submitted to the electors." Cal. Const. art. II, § 9. The issue addressed by the Pechanga and
Morongo lawsuits is whether the 90 day period includes certification of the signature attached to the
proposition by the Secretary of State, or whether submissions of signatures within 90 days is sufficient.
 
 
According to the California Secretary of State, 433, 971 signatures were required to qualify each
referendum. Secretary of State Website, Initiative Update as of October 18, 2007,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm#pending_sigs (accessed, Oct. 21, 2007). Scott Macdonald,
a spokesman for the No on the Unfair Gambling Deals campaign, which opposes the tribal deals, said the
campaign submitted about 700,000 signatures for each of the referenda by Monday Oct. 8, 2007, the last
day of the state's 90-day deadline. Id. However, the tribes contend that the proponents of the referenda
missed the deadline because simply turning in the signatures by Monday, October 8 did not suffice; the
signatures should have been turned in and certified by the Secretary of State by October 8. Edward
Sifuentes, Staff Writer, North County Times,
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/10/11/news/sandiego/5_02_1410_10_07.txt (accessed Oct. 21,
2007). Although the issue has never been considered by an Appellate Court, the Secretary of the State and
her predecessors have been following a 1998 trial court ruling that the signatures submitted before the 90-
day deadline can be counted and the time it takes for the state to verify the signatures does not run against
the 90 day limit. Id.
 
 
According to the established principles of law, the court will have to decide whether the proponents of the
Referendums have substantially complied with the words and spirit of the California Constitution. In
determining this question, the court will look into whether the underlying purpose of the 90-day limit has
been met, without requiring strict, literal compliance with the section. In Costa v. Superior Court, supra, the
Supreme Court of California noted, "Particularly when a preelection challenge is brought against an
initiative measure that has been signed by the requisite number of voters to qualify it for the ballot, the
important state interest in protecting the fundamental right of the people to propose statutory or
constitutional changes through the initiative process requires that a court exercise considerable caution
before intervening to remove or withhold the measure from an imminent election." 37 Cal. 4th at 1007.
Courts are generally hesitant to intervene before the election and strike down an initiative or a referendum
on strict procedural grounds.
With respect to the substance of the initiative and referendum requirements, the Costa Court explained, "an
unreasonably literal or inflexible application of constitutional or statutory requirements that fails to take into
account the purpose underlying the particular requirement at issue would be inconsistent with the
fundamental nature of the people's constitutionally enshrined initiative power and with the well-established
'judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right
be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power,
courts will preserve it.'" 37 Cal. 4th at 1013 (quoting Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591 (1976)). In Costa, the Attorney General sought a writ of mandate to prohibit
the Secretary of State from placing a proposed initiative on the ballot, on the grounds that the version of the
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initiative that was submitted to Attorney General differed from the version that was printed on petition
forms and circulated for signatures among the voters. Id. at 986-992. The Court held that withholding the
proposition from appearing on the ballot was not justified because the discrepancies between the two
versions were immaterial and the proponents had complied with the underlying purpose of the requirement -
to guarantee against misinforming and deceiving the electorate. Id. Reviewing the decisions of other
California courts regarding this issue, the Costa Court noted, 
 
 
Thus, when California courts have encountered relatively minor defects that the courts find could not have
affected the integrity of the electoral process as a realistic and practical matter, past decisions generally
have concluded that it would be inappropriate to preclude the electorate from voting on a measure on the
basis of such a discrepancy or defect. In such cases, as long as the fundamental purposes underlying the
applicable constitutional or statutory requirements have been fulfilled, the decisions have concluded that
there has been substantial compliance with the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions and that
invalidation of a petition and preclusion of a vote on the measure is not warranted.
Id. at 1013 (emphasis in original). 
A paramount concern in determining whether a petition is valid despite an alleged defect is whether the
purpose of the technical requirement is frustrated by the defective form of the petition. Costa, 37 Cal. 4th at
1013. As the Court noted in Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 652-653 (1982) "[t]he requirements
of both the Constitution and the statute are intended to and do give information to the electors who are
asked to sign the ... petitions. If that be accomplished in any given case, little more can be asked than that a
substantial compliance with the law and the Constitution be had, and that such compliance does no violence
to a reasonable construction of the technical requirements of the law." Thus, '[o]ver the years, numerous
relatively minor departures from the constitutional and statutory requirements applicable to initiative and
referendum measures have been found to satisfy the substantial compliance test, so long as the court was
able to conclude that the departure in question, as a realistic and practical matter, did not undermine or
frustrate the basic purposes served by the statutory requirements in ensuring the integrity of the initiative or
referendum process." Costa, 37 Cal. 4th at 1019 .
In the case at hand, the court will have to decide whether the initiative proponents substantially complied
with the requirements of the California Constitution. In making this decision, the court will first have to
consider the underlying purpose of the 90 day limit. As the Court noted in Costa, "[p]ast decisions establish
that the principal purpose underlying the requirement that the proponents of an initiative measure submit a
copy of it to the Attorney General prior to circulation is to enable that official to prepare an accurate and
objective title and summary that must be prominently included in the circulated petition and that will
provide the voters whose signatures are sought with an accurate and objective description of the general
subject matter of the initiative and its main points." 37 Cal. 4th at 1023. Since it does not appear that the
proponents of the referenda have either purposefully or inadvertently misled the voters, it is likely that the
court would defer to the earlier opinion, relied on by the Secretary of State, and hold that the proponents of
the current initiative have substantially complied with the requirements of the California Constitution,
without violating the substantive requirements of the Constitution.
C. Federal Constitutional Issues
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If the referenda fail in February, the Big 4 Tribes may file a lawsuit to enforce the compacts that they
negotiated with the governor and that were approved by the legislature. Such a suit will test whether
publication of the compacts in the Federal Register by the Secretary of the Interior created a binding federal
contract between the Big 4 Tribes, the Federal Government, and the state of California, and whether the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires the federal approval of the compacts to trump
the disapproval of the compacts by the people of the State of California. This confrontation between state,
federal, and administrative law developed due to a unique set of circumstances.
The four Indian Compacts were approved by the Legislature and signed by the Governor on July 10, 2007.
California Statutes 2007, Chs. 38, 39, 40, 41. Therefore, under California law the four statutes signed by the
Governor would not have become active until January 1, 2008. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19. Following passage
of the statutes, Jack Gribbon and others filed Referendum Petitions and valid signatures to suspend
enactment of the compacts pending a vote on February 5, 2008. California Secretary of State, Official Voter
Guide, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov (accessed January 15, 2008).
During the time that the referenda were circulating but after the Secretary of State was aware that
proponents were actively trying to qualify the referenda, the Secretary of State forwarded the compacts to
the Department of Interior on September 5, 2007 for ratification by the federal government. At the time of
transmission, the compacts had not yet taken effect, but the effective date of the statutes, like all other non-
urgency statutes passed in the 2007 legislative session, was scheduled for January 1, 2008. The transmission
of the compacts by the Secretary of State was done pursuant to the language of IGRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2710 (8)
(a). Under IGRA after a state has negotiated a compact with a federally recognized Indian Tribe, the
compact must be sent to the Department of the Interior to be approved or denied by the Secretary of the
Interior. Id. This approval process has a specific timeframe. Under IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior must
approve or deny the compacts within 45 days of receipt. If the Secretary does not act within this 45 day
window, the compacts are deemed to be approved and become enforceable. Id. 
In this case, no formal action was taken on the compacts within 45 days of the transmittal. Under pressure
from the State of California and the tribes, the Secretary of the Interior published the compacts in the
Federal Register on December 4, 2007. Jim Miller, Gaming Compacts that Inspired Ballot Challenges Now
Have Federal Approval, The Press Enterprise (published December 4, 2007); Judy Lin, Casino Deals Got a
Nudge, Sacramento Bee A1 (Jan. 17, 2008). The publication by the Secretary of the Interior may have been
beyond his authority under IGRA. Under IGRA, Class III gaming can only be approved through an
effectively negotiated compact between a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a state that allows
gambling. 42 U.S.C. § 2710. Through IGRA each state defines how compacts are to be negotiated and
ratified. Id. The California process calls for the Governor to negotiate a compact with a federally recognized
Indian tribe, for the compact to then be submitted to the Legislature for approval by through a bill, and then
for the Governor to sign the bill making it an effective statute. Cal. Gov. § 2710.
Due to the successful filing of the referenda, the statutes' effective dates were extended until after the
February 2008 election. Cal. Const. art. II, § 9. Without an effective compact, the action by the Secretary of
the Interior is probably beyond his authority under IGRA. Under IGRA, Class III gaming is permissible
only if a State-Indian compact is in effect-no such effective compact existed when the Secretary of the
Interior published the four compacts in the Federal Register. 42 U.S.C. § 2710. In the context of IGRA, an
action by the Secretary of the Interior to publish a compact is without authority if the underlying compact
was invalid. Pueblo Santa Ana v. Kelly. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997).
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In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly the Pueblo Tribe of New Mexico sought a declaration of validity
concerning the gaming compacts entered into between the State of New Mexico and the Tribe under IGRA.
104 F.3d 1546. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the compacts that had been approved by
the Department of the Interior and published in the Federal Register were valid although the New Mexico
Supreme Court had invalidated them because Governor Johnson lacked legal authority to approve them. Id.
The compacts at issue in Pueblo were agreed to and signed by New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson in
February 1995. Id. at 1550. They were then forwarded onto the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of
the Interior approved the compacts and published them in the Federal Register in March of 1995. Id. After
the compacts were published in the Federal Register, the Supreme Court of New Mexico in State ex. rel.
Clark v. Johnson decided that Governor Johnson lacked the authority to sign them in July of 1995. 120
N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11, 24 (1995). The court ruled that the compacts and amendments exceeded the limits
of gaming allowed in New Mexico and that they were therefore void. Id.
The Tenth Circuit in Pueblo ruled that the actions by the Secretary of the Interior and publication of the
compacts in the Federal Register did not validate the underlying compacts. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997).
The court held that IGRA imposed two obligations to create a valid compact: "the state must have 'entered
into' a compact and the compact must be 'in effect' pursuant to Secretarial approval." Id. at 1554. The court
noted that state law determined the procedure by which a compact was to be negotiated and agreed to and
therefore the compacts at issue were invalid due to the New Mexico Supreme Court ruling them void, no
action by the Interior Department or the Secretary could cure such a fundamental problem. Id.
As in the Pueblo case the Secretary of the Interior has again likely stepped outside the bounds of his
authority by approving gaming compacts with tribes that have not yet been properly enacted under IGRA.
As previously mentioned, the California process for enacting compacts involves negotiations between the
Governor and a federally recognized Indian tribe and approval by the legislature of the compacts by enacted
statute. Only after both of these prongs have been met is a valid state-tribe compact enacted under
California law. Since California permits a mechanism for the people to postpone enactment of a statute
through the referendum process, the compacts being voted on in February 2008 are not "in effect" yet under
Pueblo and no action by the Secretary of the Interior can correct such a defect. The tribes will argue that the
federal action trumps the state action and that IGRA only requires negotiation with the state and approval
by the legislature. A court will decide what the federal law requires and whether the federal action was a
valid and enforceable one that resulted in immunizing the tribal compacts from the effects of the election.
This will likely be a major component of the post-election legal strategy of the Big 4 tribes if the compacts
are disapproved on Febrary 5.
V. Public Policy Issues
A. Proponents
The proponents of this initiative argue that voters should vote against the referenda for three reasons. First,
the compacts with the four Indian tribes deny the taxpayers a fair share of the revenues. Second, the recent
gaming compacts indicate a dramatic shift in the State's Indian Gaming Policy. And finally, these compacts
unfairly benefit four wealthy tribes at the expense of other tribes.
In support of their first assertion that the new compacts deny taxpayers a fair share of the revenues, the
proponents of this initiative point out that the projected revenue increase, estimated by the tribes, are wildly
exaggerated and overly optimistic. No on the Unfair Gambling Deals Website,
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http://nounfairdeals.com/keyfacts/factsheet.htm (accessed Oct. 21, 2007). The proponents note that "[r]ather
than utilize past state revenue sharing formulas, such as an easily verifiable per machine fee, the new deals
let tribes pay a percent of their "net win" -- as determined by the tribes themselves." Id. Therefore,
California's Independent Legislative Analyst does not expect the compacts to provide even 1% of annual
general fund revenues. Id.
Second, the proponents of the referenda contend that the recent compacts indicate a major shift in
California's policy of moderate expansion of Indian gaming. "Whereas past compacts encouraged modest
casino expansions with clear guidelines to share revenues with taxpayers, the Big 4 compacts encourage
rapid casino growth and fail to include clear and fair revenue sharing formulas to benefit taxpayers." Id. The
proponents of the referenda assert that the new compacts create "one of the Largest Expansions of Casino
Gambling in U.S. History" by making California home to some of the largest casinos in the world, with
more than twice the number of slot machines as the biggest casinos in Vegas. Therefore, those who support
the former California policy of modest casino expansion should vote against the referenda to send the
California government back to the negotiating table with the tribes to come up with a better and less
expansive deal.
Finally, the proponents of the current referenda argue that the new compacts are unfair because they create
an economic advantage for four wealthy tribes at the expense of other tribes in California. Just four of
California more than 100 Indian tribes would get about one-third of the state casino gambling pie. It would
give them an unfair competitive advantage over other gaming tribes, and could drive smaller tribal casinos
out of business altogether. Id. Moreover, the new compacts fail to increase revenue sharing opportunities
for even the poorest of non-gaming tribes. Id.
For all these reasons, the proponents of the current referenda urge California voters to vote against the
referenda and send the California Government back to negotiating tables with the Indian tribes to come up
with a better agreement.
B. Opponents
The opponents of the current referenda argue that in the face of recent budget deficits, the new historic
gaming agreements between the four California Indian tribes and the state of California are extremely
important to California citizens for three reasons. First, California will get more than $9 billion over the
next two decades without raising our taxes providing vitally needed new funding for our schools, public
safety and other services. Second, the agreements will protect and create thousands of local jobs at the four
tribes' casinos and provide tens of millions of dollars to help non-gaming tribes throughout California.
Finally, the agreements strengthen protections for casino employees and the environment.
The opponents of the referenda assert that the new deals are particularly important to California because of
California's current fiscal problems. Coalition to Protect California Budget and Economy Website,
http://www.yesforcalifornia.com/facts.php (accessed Nov. 01, 2007). The opponents point to the fact that
California continues to face chronic budget deficits and the state struggles to adequately fund education,
public safety, traffic congestion relief, healthcare and other services. Id. In the face of such a grim fiscal
situation, the new Indian gaming agreements are a source of income that California cannot afford to lose. Id.
The opponents contend that under the new agreements the four tribes will pay much higher percentages of
their net gaming revenues (up to 25%) into the state General Fund. Id. These agreements will provide the
state with more than $200 million the first year (with revenues increasing significantly in future years) and
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an estimated $9 billion over the next two decades. Id. California can use this increased income to help
balance its budget and pay for schools, roads and bridges, public safety and health care without raising taxes
or increasing debt.
Second, the opponents of the referenda argue that the new agreements will create thousands of jobs for
California citizens and provide help to non-gaming tribes. Id. The agreements benefit the tribes by allowing
them to have additional slot machines at casinos on their existing tribal lands. Id. This in turn, the opponents
argue, will create thousands of new jobs at the tribes gaming facilities. Id. In addition, under the new
agreements, the four tribes will share tens of millions of dollars from their revenues with non-gaming tribes.
Id. The new agreements also require the tribes to coordinate with local police and fire agencies, to
compensate local governments for any local services that are needed, and to resolve disputes with
surrounding communities through binding arbitration. Id. Therefore, the new agreements are beneficial not
only to the tribes, but also to California citizens and the non-gaming Indian tribes.
Finally, the opponents of the referenda contend that the agreements strengthen protections for casino
employees and the environment. Id. The new agreements preserve the right of Indian casino employees to
be represented by unions chosen through secret ballots. Id. They also ensure that the tribes will comply with
environmental review provisions that mirror the California Environmental Quality Act. Id.
For all these reasons, the opponents of the referenda urge California citizens to vote against the referenda
and keep the gaming deals in place to the benefit of California and its citizens.
VI. Conclusion
As a hotly debated topic in today politics, the Indian gambling issue will certainly gain the attention of
many California voters. The referenda will allow the people to decide whether the compacts entered into by
the Governor and ratified by the legislature were in accordance with the attitude of the people. Legal
challenges, both those commenced pre-election and those that have yet to be litigated, will be pursued in the
even the compacts are disapproved. A NO vote on Propositions 94 through 97 will likely trigger federal
litigation to sort out the question of whether the publication of the compacts in the Federal Register late last
year trumps the right of the people of California to decide the fate of the compacts. A NO vote may also
mean continued litigation on the question of whether the 90 day requirement was satisfied by the
proponents of the referenda and on the question of whether compacting statutes are an appropriate subject
matter for the referendum process.
